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Abstract
Objective: This study examined the spontaneous use of allocentric and egocentric frames of reference and their ﬂexible use as a function
of instructions.
Method: The computerized spatial reference task created by Heiz and Barisnikov (2015) was used. Participants had to choose a frame
of reference according to three types of instructions: spontaneous, allocentric and egocentric. The performances of 16 Williams
Syndrome participants between 10 and 41 years were compared to those of two control groups (chronological age and non-verbal intel-
lectual ability).
Results: The majority of Williams Syndrome participants did not show a preference for a particular frame of reference. When explicitly
inviting participants to use an allocentric frame of reference, all three groups showed an increased use of the allocentric frame of reference.
At the same time, an important heterogeneity of type of frame of reference used by Williams Syndrome participants was observed.
Conclusion: Results demonstrate that despite difﬁculties in the spontaneous use of allocentric and egocentric frames of reference, some
Williams Syndrome participants show ﬂexibility in the use of an allocentric frame of reference when an explicit instruction is provided.
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Introduction
Williams Syndrome (WS) is a neurodevelopmental disorder caused by a microdeletion on chromosome 7q11.23 (Mervis,
2003). General intellectual functioning ranges from mild to moderate intellectual disability (IQ < 70) (Mervis & John, 2010).
Cognitive functioning is marked by an important dissociation between relatively well-developed language abilities (Bellugi,
Wang, & Jernigan, 1994; Paterson, Girelli, Butterworth, & Karmiloff-Smith, 2006) and severe deﬁcits in visuo-spatial abilities
(e.g., Bellugi, Lichtenberger, Jones, Lai, & St George, 2000; Bertrand, Mervis, & Isenberg, 1997; Mervis & John, 2010;
Mervis, 2003), except for visuo-perceptual aspects such as face and object recognition (e.g., Bellugi et al., 2000; Bellugi,
Sabo, & Vaid, 1988; Bertrand et al., 1997). Deﬁcits in visuo-spatial abilities are considered to have a negative affect on aca-
demic achievement (Mervis & John, 2010). Difﬁculties in the acquisition of written language (Howlin, Elison, Udwin, &
Stinton, 2010; Mervis, 2009; Volterra, Capirci, & Cristina, 2001), geometry and numerical processing (i.e., numerical abili-
ties; Paterson et al., 2006) have been linked to visuo-spatial deﬁcits observed in WS individuals. Furthermore, difﬁculties in
activities of everyday-living, including practical and occupational skills, are also systematically reported from WS’ families
and care givers (Fisher, Lense, & Dykens, 2016; Mervis & Klein-Tasman, 2000). Compared to some speciﬁc genetic etiolo-
gies with intellectual disabilities, such as Prader-Willi and Down Syndrome, individuals with WS have been reported to be
less likely to engage in any visuo-spatial leisure activities, such as puzzles, drawing, mazes tasks (Rosner, Hodapp, Fidler,
Sagun, & Dykens, 2004).




on 28 September 2017
Several studies using the developmental Visual Motor Integration test (VMI, Beery & Beery, 2004) have highlighted
visuo-constructive deﬁcits in the WS population when copying geometric ﬁgures (Bertrand et al., 1997; Dykens, Rosner, &
Ly, 2001). These results have been conﬁrmed by studies using block design tasks and block reconstruction procedures (e.g.,
Bertrand et al., 1997; Farran, Jarrold, & Gathercole, 2001; Semel & Rosner, 2003). Some studies have also documented deﬁ-
cits in navigation abilities, such as way-ﬁnding, learning a route (Farran, Blades, Boucher, & Tranter, 2010), or following a
road according to a map (Semel & Rosner, 2003). In addition, difﬁculties in understanding projective terms (spatial preposi-
tions) used to encode spatial relationships between elements or objects have been reported (e.g., Bellugi et al., 2000; Hayward
& Tarr, 1995). As a result, WS individuals have difﬁculties processing spatial representations expressed through language,
and more speciﬁcally through spatial vocabulary (e.g., behind, in front of, etc.). Similarly, individuals with WS have been
shown to face important difﬁculties in the above-mentioned tasks requiring the encoding of spatial relationships between sev-
eral objects and showed difﬁculties using an external object as a point of reference (Farran & Jarrold, 2003; Nardini,
Atkinson, Braddick, & Burgess, 2008). The presence of visuo-spatial deﬁcits in individuals with intellectual disabilities of
various origins has been extensively reported (Simon, 2007; Vicario, Yates, & Nicholls, 2013), but little is known about the
way frames of reference (FOR) are represented and used. This is an important shortcoming in literature because accurate FOR
processing is a necessary component of many visuo-spatial tasks and learning abilities (Heiz & Barisnikov, 2015; Kim &
Cameron, 2016; Zhou, McBride-Chang, & Wong, 2014).
More speciﬁcally, the ability to choose a suitable point of reference is important for the deﬁnition of spatial relations
between objects and oneself in order to represent the environment. The majority of behavioral and neurocognitive studies
indicate that egocentric and allocentric FOR are mainly used to determine the location of an object (see Galati et al., 2000;
Howard & Templeton, 1966; Levinson, 1996; Lourenco & Frick, 2013; Newcombe, Huttenlocher, Drummey, & Wiley,
1998). The egocentric FOR concerns the location of an object in comparison to one’s own bodily position, for example “the
apple is in front of me” (Galati et al., 2000). Developmental studies show that the egocentric FOR used by typically develop-
ing (TD) children, develops early (Taylor & Tversky, 1996) and is used automatically and naturally (Shelton & Mcnamara,
1997). The allocentric FOR uses the location of an external object in relation to its different constituent parts and to other ob-
jects in the environment (Klatzky, 1998), for example “the apple is on the table”. In contrast to the egocentric FOR, the allo-
centric FOR develops later in childhood (Huttenlocher, Newcombe, & Sandberg, 1994; Nardini, Burgess, Breckenridge, &
Atkinson, 2006; Piaget & Inhelder, 1947; Rochat, 1995).
In their recent study, Heiz and Barisnikov (2015) assessed developmental trends in the use of egocentric and allocentric
FOR. They used an adapted spatial reference task “Where is the donut?” (Taylor & Rapp, 2004) to assess children’s spontane-
ous use of egocentric and allocentric FOR, as well as their capacity to ﬂexibly switch from one type of FOR to another. In the
spontaneous condition, most of the children aged 7 and above used an allocentric FOR. In the allocentric condition, children
aged 6 or less gave signiﬁcantly more allocentric responses. In the egocentric condition, all participants gave more egocentric
responses, independently of their age group. This study showed that simple instructions enable children to use allocentric and
egocentric FORs earlier, more ﬂexibly and more effectively than in spontaneous task conditions. Taylor and Rapp (2004) as-
sessed adults with their spatial reference task “Where is the Donut?” and reported that adults with a typical development pref-
erentially use an allocentric FOR if no speciﬁc instructions have been given and can ﬂexibly use an egocentric FOR if they
are instructed to. However, in contrast to literature on TD populations, we currently have very little knowledge about the way
children and adults with WS code their spatial environment and which point of reference they preferentially use to deﬁne
object locations.
Very few studies have assessed the ability to use egocentric and allocentric FOR in WS individuals despite the large num-
ber of studies on visuo-spatial skills, such as drawing (Bellugi et al., 1988; Bertrand et al., 1997; Dykens et al., 2001) and
block design (Bihrle, Bellugi, Delis, & Marks, 1989; Farran et al., 2001), which more or less strongly rely on the use of an
accurate FOR.
Nardini and colleagues (2008) used a spatial search task to determine whether spatial deﬁcits in WS individuals (aged
5–42 years old) are restricted to speciﬁc FOR. These authors observed important difﬁculties especially in situations involv-
ing allocentric FOR. These results contrast those from a study by Bernardino, Mouga, Castelo-Branco and van Asselen
(2013) who used three spatial judgment tasks that showed difﬁculties in situations involving egocentric or allocentric FOR.
Similar results were observed by Broadbent, Farran and Tolmie (2014) using a virtual cross-maze task to assess naviga-
tional strategies employed by individuals with WS (mean age 21 years old). During spontaneous navigation, in contrast to
TD controls, WS participants did not predominantly employ a sequential egocentric strategy (recalling the sequence of left-
right body turns throughout the task) and exhibited deﬁcits in allocentric spatial coding. However, the task used in this
study required spatial memory and planning abilities that are weak in individuals with WS (Mandolesi et al., 2009).
Discrepancies between different studies that have explored the use of different FOR in WS individuals could be due to
methodological differences. Experimental designs vary in factors known to inﬂuence the choice of a particular FOR to
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perform a task (Coie, Costanzo & Farnill, 1973, cited by Verjat, 1994), such as the number of objects, the nature of spatial
dimensions (e.g., above/below; left/right), and the response modalities (e.g., oral or manual). Furthermore, the majority of
these tasks required complex abilities (e.g., spatial memory, mental imagery), known to be deﬁcient in the WS population,
which could have inﬂuenced these results. It is important to note that in contrast to ﬁndings from developmental literature,
only a few studies have speciﬁcally and directly assessed the use of different FOR in the WS population. Therefore, it re-
mains unclear whether individuals with WS are able to use egocentric and allocentric FOR and which of these FOR is used
preferentially. Finally, it remains unknown how ﬂexible the use of these FOR in individuals with WS is and whether it can
be adapted to task requirements and instructions.
In the present study, we used the spatial reference task developed by Heiz and Barisnikov (2015) with a simple 2-object
scenario allowing us to study the use of FOR in three conditions (spontaneous, allocentric, and egocentric) without a memory
and verbal response demand. The ﬁrst aim of the present study was to assess the spontaneous use of an egocentric or allo-
centric FOR in the WS population. The second aim was to examine the ﬂexibility of the use of these FOR in the presence of
verbal cues, favouring one of the two types of FOR. With the spatial reference task (Heiz & Barisnikov, 2015), we speciﬁ-




Sixteen participants with WS (seven male) aged between 10 and 41 years (mean age = 21.6, SD = 9.5, range: 10.1–41.8
years) took part in this study. All participants with WS had been diagnosed through genetic analysis (ﬂuorescence in situ
hybridization—FISH test). They were recruited via the Association Suisse du Syndrome de Williams-Beuren, Switzerland, and
the Association France Rhône-Alpes, France.
The ﬁrst control group TD_CA was comprised of 16 typically developing individuals, of which seven were male (mean chro-
nological age = 22.5, SD = 9.6, range: 10.2–41.2 years; mean RCPM score = 29.94 ± 3.79) matched with the WS participants
by chronological age (CA) (t(30) = 0.06, p = .995). The second control group TD_MA was comprised of 16 TD children, of
which six were male (mean chronological age = 6.6, SD = 2.3, range: 4.3–10.1 years) matched with the WS participants for
non-verbal intellectual ability, as measured by the Raven Colored Progressive Matrices (RCPM; Raven, Raven, Court, & Raven,
2003). All control children had a percentile score over the 50th percentile. The TD_MA (mean RCPM score = 17.63 ± 7.89)
and the WS groups (mean RCPM score = 16.88 ± 8.37) did not differ on raw scores on the RCPM (t(30) = −0.334, p = .741)
but as expected, there was a signiﬁcant difference for chronological age (t(30) = 6.36, p < .001).
All TD children were recruited from regular primary schools in the city of Geneva, Switzerland. All adult participants
were recruited from the social circles of researchers and through advertisements. Finally, all participants were native French
speakers.
The ethics committee of the Department of Psychology at the University of Geneva and the Cantonal Authorities for
Primary Education of Geneva approved the study. Informed consent was obtained from the parents of child participants and
from the children themselves. Direct written informed consent was obtained from the adult participants.
Materials
The material consisted of a computerized spatial reference task (Heiz & Barisnikov, 2015). It included 108 trials, each one
consisting of a stimulus-picture and four response-pictures appearing simultaneously.
The stimulus-picture illustrated two objects: a reference object and a “to-be-located object” whose location had to be deter-
mined. The reference object, with intrinsic sides, was one of eight everyday objects: a chair, a bicycle, a frying pan, a pitcher,
a violin, a toy, a bottle, and a hairbrush. This object was presented in three different possible orientations: left, right, or back
(The front position was not used, because when the object of the stimulus-picture is oriented in the front position, egocentric
and the allocentric responses are the same.) (see Fig. 1 for an example).
The located object, without intrinsic sides, was a soccer ball; this object looks the same from different representations (2D
or 3D) and could be placed in one of two locations, on the left or on the right side of the reference object. This resulted in a
total of six different conﬁgurations (3 orientations × 2 locations), with each conﬁguration being tested six times.
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In the response-pictures, the reference object was always presented in the same orientation and seen from above. The soc-
cer ball could be placed in four different locations, either on the left (ImL), right (ImR), front (ImF), or back (ImB) of the
object. A large ﬁxation cross separated each trial. Fig. 2 shows an example of a trial.
Procedure
The task was presented on a Windows touch screen computer (19-in. color monitor) running Eprime2.0® Software.
Participants were informed that they would be presented with the stimulus-picture, two objects (the reference object and the
to-be-located soccer ball), and four response-pictures. They were then instructed to select the correct response-picture as fast
as possible according to the instructions, by touching the selected response-picture on the screen.
The task was presented three times to each participant in three different conditions: spontaneous, egocentric, or allocentric.
Each task began with a training phase consisting of ﬁve trials intended to verify that the task instructions were understood.
All participants began with the spontaneous condition, then, half continued with the allocentric condition followed by the
egocentric condition. The order of the condition was reversed for the other half of the participants. When starting the task,
Fig. 1. Example of the three different orientations of the reference object (left, right, and back) (Heiz & Barisnikov, 2015).
Fig. 2. Example of a trial: in this example, ImR is the egocentric response-picture and the ImF is the allocentric response-picture. ImB and ImL are incorrect
responses. All elements were displayed at the same time (Heiz & Barisnikov, 2015).
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participants were randomly allocated to one of the two conditions. There was a pause of at least 20 min between the different
conditions in order to avoid the effects of fatigue. The instructions given for the three conditions were the following:
• Spontaneous condition: “Select among the four small pictures the one that matches the big one, the one that shows
the soccer ball in the right place”. Participants’ responses were classiﬁed depending on the type of picture they
selected: allocentric, egocentric or incorrect for the other two picture types.
• Egocentric condition: “Select among the four small pictures the one that matches the big one, the one that shows the
soccer ball in the right place in relation to yourself”. Response scoring was the same as for the spontaneous condition.
• Allocentric condition: “Select among the four small pictures the one that matches the big one, the one that shows the soc-
cer ball in the right place in relation to the object”. Response scoring was the same as for the previous two conditions.
All the instructions were given in French.
Statistical analyses
Firstly, a Chi-Square goodness-of-ﬁt test (p < .005) was performed on individual responses to classify each participant ac-
cording to their type of response in each of the three experimental conditions. Participants were classiﬁed as having an (1)
egocentric response (highest egocentric responses); (2) allocentric response (highest allocentric responses); or (3) incorrect
response (highest incorrect responses). These classiﬁcations were used to perform a contingency table analysis (Groups ×
FOR) within each experimental condition.
Subsequently, the percentages of allocentric, egocentric and incorrect (not egocentric and not allocentric) responses were
calculated for each instruction and each participant.
We aimed to determine the extent to which participants were able to change their use of FOR as a function of the task con-
dition. A 3 (group) × 2 (condition: spontaneous vs. allocentric or spontaneous vs. egocentric) mixed ANOVAs were con-
ducted on the percentages of allocentric responses in the spontaneous and allocentric conditions, and on the percentages of
egocentric responses in the spontaneous and egocentric conditions, respectively. Additional post hoc analyses were performed
in order to determine the source of any signiﬁcant effects, with a Bonferroni adjustment applied to p values where necessary.
Finally, in order to examine the possible heterogeneity of results within the WS population, a cluster analysis was run.
Firstly, the analysis was run on the basis of individual response patterns on the percentage of allocentric responses given by
participants in the spontaneous and allocentric instructions condition. Secondly, it was run on the percentage of egocentric re-
sponses given by participants in the spontaneous and egocentric instructions condition.
All analyses were run on SPSS.
Results
Group Comparisons
Spontaneous instructions. In the spontaneous instructions condition, a contingency table analysis (table 5 × 3) showed that
most WS individuals (9/16 participants) gave an incorrect response (see Table 1), ﬁve WS individuals preferentially used the
allocentric FOR and only two WS individuals preferentially used the egocentric FOR. For the TD_CA group, the contingency
table showed that all participants preferentially used the allocentric FOR (16/16). For the TD_MA group, participants either
preferentially used the allocentric FOR (7/16) or gave incorrect response (6/16), while only three TD_MA individuals prefer-
entially used the egocentric FOR.




WS 5 2 9
TD_CA 16 0 0
TD_MA 7 3 6
Total 28 5 15
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A χ2 test of independence showed a signiﬁcant association between the two variables “group” and “type of response” (χ2(4) =
18.56, p = .001). Cramer’s V was 0.44, showing that nearly 19% of variation in one variable could be explained by variation in
the other variable, arguing for a link between the variables “group” and “type of response”.
Allocentric instructions. In the allocentric instructions condition, a contingency table analysis (table 5 × 3) showed that the
majority of participants preferentially used the allocentric FOR, in all groups (see Table 2).
A χ2 test of independence revealed a signiﬁcant association between the two variables “group” and “type of response”
(χ2(4) = 6.99, p = .041). Cramer’s V was 0.27; showing that nearly 7% of variation in one variable could be explained by var-
iation in the other variable.
A mixed ANOVA for the variables “group” and “type of instruction” (spontaneous vs. allocentric) on the percentage of al-
locentric responses revealed a signiﬁcant group effect (F(2, 45) = 26.114, MSE = 383.817, p < .001, η
2 = .537) but no effect
of the type of instruction (F(1, 45) = 0.705, MSE = 767.634, p = .406, η
2 = .015). However, a signiﬁcant interaction was
observed (F(2, 45) = 4.714, p = .014, η
2 = .173). Tukey Post-Hoc tests conﬁrmed a difference between the WS group and the
TD_CA group. Furthermore, they showed no signiﬁcant difference between the WS and TD_MA groups. A signiﬁcant inter-
action was also observed (F(2, 45) = 18.853, p < .001, η
2 = .456). The “type of instruction” had an effect only on the TD_MA
group. In this group, Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise post-hoc comparisons revealed signiﬁcantly better performances (t(15) =
−3.091, p = .007) following the allocentric instructions compared to the spontaneous instructions (see Fig. 3).
Egocentric instructions. In the egocentric instructions condition, a contingency table analysis (table 5 × 3) showed that many
individuals with WS (7/16) gave incorrect responses, ﬁve preferentially used the egocentric FOR and four preferentially used
the allocentric FOR (see Table 3). The two control groups preferentially used the egocentric FOR (≥11/16).
A χ2 test of independence revealed a signiﬁcant association between the variables “group” and “type of response” (χ2(4) =
14.52, p = .006). Cramer’s V was 0.39, with nearly 13% of variation of a variable explained by variation in the other
variable.
A mixed ANOVA for the variables “group” and “type of instruction” (spontaneous vs. egocentric) on the percentage of ego-
centric response revealed a main effect of the instruction’s condition, (F(1, 45) = 73.752, MSE = 809.105, p < .001, η
2 = .621).




WS 8 3 5
TD_CA 13 3 0
TD_MA 11 1 4
Total 32 7 9
Fig. 3. Percentages and standard errors of allocentric responses in the spontaneous and allocentric instructions conditions for each group.
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In general, all participants gave more egocentric responses in the egocentric instructions condition (M = 60.96%, SD = 17.59)
as compared to the spontaneous instructions condition (M = 24.43%, SD = 10.82) (see Fig. 4).
A signiﬁcant interaction was also observed (F(2, 45) = 18.853, p < .001, η
2 = .456). Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise post-hoc
comparisons revealed an advantage for the egocentric versus spontaneous condition in the TD_CA group (t(15) = −8.529, p <
.001) and TD_MA (t(15) = −3.447, p = .004), with a particularly large advantage for the TD_CA group (see Fig. 4). A trend
towards a signiﬁcant difference was found for the WS group (t(15) = −1.909, p = .076).
Cluster Analyses
Allocentric instructions. A hierarchical cluster analysis using Ward’s method produced three clusters corresponding to three
patterns of responses, as determined by the percentage of allocentric responses given by the participants in the spontaneous
and allocentric instructions conditions (F(2, 13) = 5.513, MSE = 88.48, p = .018, η
2 = .459) (see Fig. 5). The ﬁrst cluster,
with ﬁve participants, was characterized by a minimum of 40% of allocentric responses. The second cluster, with six partici-
pants, was characterized by a marginally signiﬁcant increase of allocentric responses in the allocentric instructions condition
(F(1, 5) = 6.181, MSE = 83.411, p = .055, η
2 = .553). The third cluster, with ﬁve participants, was characterized by a low per-
centage of allocentric responses in the spontaneous and allocentric instructions condition.
Egocentric instructions. A second hierarchical cluster analysis using Ward’s method was run on the percentage of egocentric
responses given by participants in the spontaneous and egocentric instructions conditions. The analysis was signiﬁcant and
yielded three clusters (F(2, 13) = 12.957, MSE = 175.047, p = .001, η
2 = .666) (see Fig. 6). The ﬁrst cluster, with three partici-
pants, was characterized by a high increase of egocentric responses in the egocentric instructions condition. The second clus-
ter included only one participant and was characterized by a high percentage of egocentric responses in the spontaneous and
egocentric instructions conditions. The third cluster, with 12 participants, was characterized by a low percentage of egocentric
responses in spontaneous and egocentric instructions conditions.




WS 5 4 7
TD_CA 13 3 0
TD_MA 11 4 1
Total 29 11 8
Fig. 4. Percentages of allocentric responses in the spontaneous and allocentric instructions condition for each cluster group.
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Discussion
The present study aimed to assess the use of egocentric and allocentric FOR by means of a spatial reference task, in either
spontaneous conditions or in conditions where participants were explicitly instructed to use a speciﬁc type of FOR. The re-
sults of the WS participants were compared to those of two TD control groups matched individually on chronological age
(CA) and on non-verbal abilities (MA).
Results revealed that the majority of the WS participants (9/16) did not show a preference towards a particular FOR and
gave a majority of incorrect responses, while ﬁve WS individuals spontaneously used an “allocentric” FOR and two used an
“egocentric” FOR. In contrast, the majority of participants in both control groups spontaneously used an allocentic FOR.
Secondly, results showed that speciﬁc instructions helped participants in all three groups to make a more appropriate and con-
sistent choice of FOR. Allocentric instructions seemed to help some WS participants to make use of an allocentric FOR. At
the same time, an important variability in performances was observed in all three conditions in the WS group.
In the spontaneous instructions condition, the majority of WS participants gave incorrect responses showing difﬁculties
using an egocentric or allocentric FOR. Our results are in line with Bernardino and colleagues’ (2013) results reporting that
individuals with WS have deﬁcits using both FOR. Similarly, Broadbent and colleagues (2014) observed difﬁculties in WS
individuals using both FOR during spontaneous conditions of a virtual maze task.
In the allocentric instructions condition, some WS participants improved with the use of an allocentric FOR. These results
contrast those of previous studies showing persistent difﬁculties using an allocentric FOR in conditions favouring this FOR.
Either because an egocentric FOR was not available (Nardini et al., 2008) or because the task could not be performed with a
body-centered FOR (Bernardino et al., 2013; Farran & Jarrold, 2005). In the experimental design of the present study, con-
trary to previous studies, scenes depicting both FOR were available when performing the task with explicit allocentric instruc-
tions. Furthermore, the positive affect of the use of speciﬁc instructions to favor the use of allocentric FOR indicates the
existence of some degree of ﬂexibility of FOR use in some WS participants, similarly to the TD control group (MA).
Fig. 5. Percentages and standard errors for egocentric responses in the spontaneous and egocentric instructions conditions.
Fig. 6. Percentages of egocentric responses in the spontaneous and egocentric instructions conditions for each cluster group.
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This latter group improved performances compared to those in the spontaneous instructions condition where they preferen-
tially used egocentric FOR or gave incorrect responses. These results suggest that children demonstrate ﬂexibility in the use
of allocentric FOR at a much younger age than evidenced in the spontaneous instructions condition. This is also in accordance
with a developmental study (Heiz & Barisnikov, 2015) showing a signiﬁcant improvement in performances in an allocentric
instructions conditions in TD children (aged 4, 5, and 6) relative to those in spontaneous instructions conditions.
It is to be noted that no signiﬁcant differences in performances were found between our WS participants and the TD_MA
control group, which could be seen as a developmental delay in the WS group. However, such a delay could not be estab-
lished for all WS subgroups showing a distinct pattern of performances, which is discussed below.
Additionally, the TD_CA group used more allocentric FOR than the WS group did. The results of the TD_CA group, com-
prised of a majority of adults (M = 22;5 years old), are in accordance with several studies reporting that adults preferentially
use an allocentric FOR, also known as an intrinsic FOR (Carlson-Radvansky & Jiang, 1998; Taylor & Rapp, 2004). However,
they showed the ability to easily switch to the use of an egocentric FOR depending on the spatial situation (Taylor & Rapp,
2004). It has been demonstrated and suggested that adults can alter between the 2 FOR and invest more cognitive effort to pro-
cess non-preferred frames of reference (Carlson, West, Taylor, & Herndon, 2002; Taylor & Rapp, 2004). Nevertheless, simi-
larly to previous literature, our results show that the TD_CA group can ﬂexibly shift between an egocentric and an allocentric
FOR depending on the instructions provided.
Some of the WS participants were also able to switch between the use of one or another FOR according to instructions. In
contrast to literature reporting persistent visuo-spatial deﬁcits in the WS population, our results show that when precise and
speciﬁc instructions are provided (verbal cues), these individuals can ﬂexibly use both types of FOR. These encouraging re-
sults could open the perspective for an intervention strategy beneﬁting from verbal cues to guide and support the use of spe-
ciﬁc FOR, namely the allocentric and/or egocentric FOR.
Similarly to the TD_MA control group, the allocentric instructions helped some WS participants to improve their perfor-
mances. However, an important heterogeneity in the WS participants’ performances was observed. These results indicate the
need for more individual and qualitative analyses of the affect of speciﬁc instructions on WS individual performances. Thus,
three subgroups with distinct performance patterns were observed (see Fig. 5): the ﬁrst subgroup (5/16) showed a similar per-
formance pattern to the TD_MA controls; the second subgroup (six WS) outperformed the ﬁrst subgroup in the spontaneous
condition. Unlike these two WS subgroups, the third subgroup (ﬁve WS) showed particular difﬁculties in using an allocentric
FOR in both conditions. These difﬁculties could be interpreted in light of Farran and colleagues’ (2001; 2003) ﬁndings sug-
gesting that WS individuals have a major deﬁcit in understanding categorical spatial locations (e.g., above/below) and in co-
ordinating spatial relations relative to different reference points or landmarks. Similarly, Nardini and colleagues (2008) sug-
gested that the highly impaired use of an allocentric FOR (“array-move” condition) in WS individuals could be partly related
to impairment in the use of visual landmarks to code locations. However, considering the small number of WS individuals in
each subgroup, the existence of distinct patterns of performances needs to be conﬁrmed with a larger number of participants.
At the same time, our results show that the use of a cluster analysis can be very informative about the nature of visuo-spatial
processing styles in WS individuals. In contrast, WS average group performances proved to be less pertinent for understand-
ing the way WS individual’s process spatial information.
In the egocentric instructions condition, WS participants, similarly to the control groups, gave more egocentric responses
compared to the spontaneous instructions condition. The few studies that proposed an “imposed” egocentric condition showed
contrasting results. Nardini and colleagues (2008) reported that WS individuals were able to use body-FOR in both condi-
tions. However, Bernardino and colleagues (2013) reported that difﬁculties in the spontaneous use of an egocentric FOR re-
mained constant in the “imposed” egocentric condition. Broadbent and colleagues (2014) reported difﬁculties in the WS
group when using an egocentric FOR in the spontaneous instructions condition; however, they did not propose an “imposed”
egocentric condition. Discrepancies between these studies could be due to methodological differences. Experimental designs
varied with respect to the number of objects used, the type of material and its presentation mode (computerized 2D or 3D
model, virtual maze), and the response modalities (oral or manual). Furthermore, the majority of these tasks required complex
abilities (e.g., spatial memory, mental imagery), known to be deﬁcient in the WS population, which could have inﬂuenced
these results.
Nevertheless, the analyses of the performances of our WS individuals revealed three subgroups with distinct patterns of
performances. While the improvement in the use of an egocentric FOR in the ﬁrst subgroup (three participants) was compara-
ble to those of the TD_MA control group, the second subgroup (one participant) showed better performances in both condi-
tions (egocentric and spontaneous), comparable to the TD_CA controls. In contrast, the third subgroup was comprised of a
majority of participants (12/16) with difﬁculties using their own body as a FOR. Those who failed to use the egocentric FOR
might have a poor representation of their body schema. A progressive shift from a body-centered to an object-centered FOR
seems to take place between the ages of 5 and 7 (Heiz & Barisnikov, 2015; Nardini et al., 2006) or between the ages of 7 and
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10 (Bullens, Iglói, Berthoz, Postma, & Rondi-Reig, 2010; Piaget & Inhelder, 1947). Little is known about body-based repre-
sentations in the WS population. The few studies that assessed these abilities reported poor body schema knowledge in WS
children and adults. Dykens and colleagues (2001) reported that WS participants drew poor human ﬁgures with a smaller
number of portrayed body parts in comparison to the TD_MA control group. A low recognition of and naming of body parts
and difﬁculties in identifying the right and the left parts of own or other bodies has also been reported (Heiz, Cengic,
Fernandes, & Barisnikov, 2015). According to a recent study (Saj, Heiz, & Barisnikov, 2017), these body representation difﬁ-
culties in WS participants may be explained by a signiﬁcant left deviation of their bodily sagittal plan, which allows an indi-
vidual to determine a spatial location (e.g., on my left/right). The lack of a well-established representation of left and right
directions might, according to Bernardino and colleagues (2013), introduce additional difﬁculties for WS participants.
Broadbent and colleagues (2014, 2015) also showed that unlike TD children, for whom a sequential egocentric strategy is pre-
dominant, individuals with WS begin a spatial navigation task by using a body-based strategy (going in the correct direction),
but then rapidly switch to an environmental view-matching strategy (non-speciﬁc). Although our participants were able to dis-
tinguish if an object was located on the left or on the right (two opposite sides) of their body at the beginning of the task, they
exhibited difﬁculties with this distinction throughout the rest of the task. Similarly, our participants were able to distinguish if
an object was on one side or the other of their body, on the left or on the right, during the training phase, but exhibited general
difﬁculties with this distinction throughout the rest of the task. Therefore, the lack of a fully developed body representation in
the WS population could also lead to difﬁculties in maintaining a stable representation of spatial location (with spatial terms)
and to coordinate different spatial information (between body and objects).
Nevertheless, our results are the ﬁrst to show that a two-object experimental design with simple instructions helps to im-
prove ﬂexibility in the choice of a speciﬁc FOR. These ﬁndings are in contrast to literature reporting persistent visuo-spatial
deﬁcit in WS individuals. Consequently, our results could contribute signiﬁcantly to intervention strategies for visuo-spatial
processing difﬁculties in WS individuals. Precise and speciﬁc instructions could help individuals with WS to use a viewpoint
according to the situation and to subsequently improve their ability to process spatial information. Genetic syndromes marked
by similar visuo-spatial deﬁcits (e.g., Turner syndrome, 22q11deletion syndrome) and learning difﬁculties (Simon, 2007;
Vicario et al., 2013) may also beneﬁt from this kind of cueing strategy.
However, these important results do have some limitations. It is to be noted that the comparison between groups showed
no signiﬁcant differences in performances between some of our WS participants and the TD_MA control group, which could
be seen as a developmental delay. Although the RCPM is a reliable measure in obtaining a non-verbal functioning score in
WS individuals and can be used to match WS individuals to other participant groups (Van Herwegen, Farran, & Annaz,
2011), there is an important difference in chronological age between these groups that limits the interpretation of the present
results. Consequently, a distinct pattern of performances exhibited by different WS subgroups could not be compared to those
of the TD_MA controls.
Although a qualitative analysis of WS performances highlights the existence of different patterns of performances, these re-
sults need to be conﬁrmed with a larger number of WS participants. The reason for this being that the statistical power of the
different subgroups was too weak to perform further analyses of different patterns of performances observed. Although no
affect of age on WS performances was observed, a larger number of WS individuals grouped by age could also provide more
accurate information on the developmental trajectory of the use of speciﬁc FOR. This could also allow more precise compari-
sons between children and adult groups when examining the inﬂuence of experience (e.g., work place, everyday life activities)
on spatial abilities, for example.
In conclusion, results demonstrate that despite difﬁculties in the spontaneous use of allocentric and egocentric FOR, some
WS participants show ﬂexibility in the use of allocentric FOR when an explicit instruction is provided. In contrast, they
exhibit particular difﬁculties in the use of an egocentric FOR, which may be the result of a poor representation of their body
schema. This could be the primary cause of their deﬁcit in representing spatial locations (e.g., left/right) and establishing spa-
tial FOR, which are both necessary for spatial task solving (e.g., navigation; drawing). Clinical assessments should consider
the existence of contrasted patterns of performances among WS participants, which could also lead to the development of
adapted intervention strategies.
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